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This Note argues that federal common law should determine all attribution of liability issues
in actions brought under the FSIA. Part I discusses the FSIA, its history and policies, and the sole
U.S. Supreme Court decision to discuss the proper choice of law approach for attribution of liabil-
ity under the FSIA. Part II examines subsequent cases that have either followed or distinguished
the Supreme Court’s choice of law approach in deciding questions of agency or respondeat supe-
rior. Part III argues that congressional intent demands the application of federal common law to
determine questions of attribution of liability in actions brought under the FSIA. This Note con-
cludes that federal courts should apply federal common law to determine the limited question of
attribution of liability.
NOTES
CHOOSING LAW FOR ATFRIBUTING LIABILITY
UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT: A PROPOSAL FOR
UNIFORMITY*
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (the "FSIA" or "Act")' in order to establish the circum-
stances and procedures by which a foreign state or its instru-
mentality may be sued in a U.S. court.2 To this end, the FSIA
sets forth the basis for obtaining both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction over a foreign state or its instrumentalities.'
The Act does not include, however, any substantive law of lia-
bility, because its basic premise is non-liability, i.e., immunity.4
Nonetheless, issues of subject matter jurisdiction often entail
questions of substantive law under the FSIA.' For example,
plaintiffs have sued a foreign state based on the acts or omis-
sions of its instrumentality6 by applying the related doctrines
of respondeat superior or agency,7 so that the liabilities of the
* The author wishes to thank Professor Marc Arkin, Fordham University, School
of Law, for her valuable criticisms and comments, and Paul Borysewicz for his
thoughtful readings.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604. See generally MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY IN COMMER-
CIAL TRANSACTIONS (1991); Beverly May Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American
Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. LJ. 1009
(1979).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604 (describing extent of immunity from subject matter juris-
diction) and 1608 (describing methods of obtaining personal jurisdiction) (1988).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
5. See generally A. John Sutham, Note, Brokering a Difficult Marriage: Substantive De-
fenses Under Rule 60(b)(4) Relief from Default Judgments in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Pro-
ceedings, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 216 (1990-1991) (discussing overlap of substantive
and jurisdictional issues in FSIA).
6. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 2 cmt. a (1958) (comparing respondeat
superior terms "master and servant" to agency terms "principal and agent" and not-
ing that "[a] master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent");
HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PART-
NERSHIP § 2 (2d ed. 1990) (defining law of agency as including principal-agent as well
as master-servant relationships); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62, 1211-12 (6th ed. 1990)
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8instrumentalities are attributed to the foreign state.
In these "attribution of liability" cases, the court must de-
cide whether to apply federal or state common law to define
the legal relationship between a foreign state and its instru-
mentality. 9 Although respondeat superior and agency are
closely related doctrines, courts have inconsistently chosen the
governing law for FSIA attribution of liability issues.' 0 When
the attribution of liability is based on principles of agency,
most courts have applied federal common law."I On the other
hand, if attribution of liability is based on the principle of re-
spondeat superior, courts have held that state common law
controls. 12
(defining "respondeat superior" as "the maxim [holding] masters liable in certain
cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent" and
defining "agency" as the "[r]elation in which one person acts for or represents an-
other by latter's authority, either in the relationship of principal and agent or master and
servant") (emphasis added).
8. See GORDON A. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 321 (Richard B. Lillich ed. 1983). Mr. Christenson notes that
"[piroperly understood, the doctrine of attribution in international law serves the
purpose of allocating responsibility to the State for the consequences of certain
wrongful acts or omissions of its organs and officials. It also defines the sphere of
private or non-State conduct for which the state bears no responsibility." Id. See
Ronald D. Lee, Note, jurisdiction Over Foreign States for Acts of Their Instrumentalities: A
Modelfor Attributing Liability, 94 YALE L.J. 394 (1984) (discussing suits brought against
foreign states based on attribution principles). The phrase "attribution of liability" is
also used in non-FSIA contexts to describe situations in which one party is held vicar-
iously liable for the acts of another. See Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th
Cir. 1986) (discussing attribution of acts of county officials to state commission
through doctrine of respondeat superior in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action); Keys
v. Wolfe, 540 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (discussing attribution principles
"such as conspiracy membership, agency, or aider and abettor"), rev 'd on other grounds,
709 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1983).
9. See, e.g., Skeen v. Federative Republic of Braz., 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C.
1983).
10. Compare First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb.-Perma-
nent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989) (declining to apply federal common law to
questions of agency) with Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying federal commom law to determine propriety
of attributing acts of instrumentality to foreign state based on agency principles).
11. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 879 F.2d 170, 177
(5th Cir. 1989); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government
of Socialist Eth., 616 F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Mich. 1985); but see First Fidelity Bank,
N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir.
1989) (declining to apply federal common law to agency issue).
12. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 27 (1990);Joseph v. Office of Consulate General of Nig., 830 F.2d
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This Note argues that federal common law should deter-
mine all attribution of liability issues in actions brought under
the FSIA. Part I discusses the FSIA, its history and policies,
and the sole U.S. Supreme Court decision to discuss the
proper choice of law approach for attribution of liability under
the FSIA. Part II examines subsequent cases that have either
followed or distinguished the Supreme Court's choice of law
approach in deciding questions of agency or respondeat supe-
rior. Part III argues that congressional intent demands the ap-
plication of federal common law to determine questions of at-
tribution of liability in actions brought under the FSIA. This
Note concludes that federal courts should apply federal com-
mon law to determine the limited question of attribution of
liability.'"
I. U.S. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES PRACTICE.
PAST AND PRESENT
Prior to the passage of the FSIA in 1976, U.S. courts
granted immunity to foreign sovereigns based primarily on
political, as opposed to legal, considerations." Congress
passed the Act to resolve the problems inherent in the ad hoc
approach to determining the scope of foreign sovereign immu-
nity. 5 A primary aim of the FSIA, therefore, was to standard-
ize and achieve uniformity in U.S. foreign sovereign immunity
practice.' 6 In its only decision to consider a choice of law
question involving the FSIA, the Supreme Court held, in First
National City Bank, N.A. v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba
("Bancec"), t7 that federal common law should determine the
separate juridical status of an entity wholly owned by a foreign
state.
1018 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Skeen v. Federative Republic
of Braz., 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983); Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F. Supp. 309
(W.D. Tex. 1980).
13. This Note limits itself to arguing for a uniform federal standard. It does not
set forth the most appropriate standard because a consideration of that issue de-
mands an in-depth analysis of the laws of nations other than the United States.
14. See infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text (discussing pre-FSIA foreign
sovereign immunity practice in United States).
15. Id. See infra notes 33-45.
16. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing congressional desire
for uniformity).
17. 462 U.S. 611 (1983) [hereinafter Bancec].
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A. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Decisions Prior to Passage of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Through the FSIA, Congress attempted to codify a system
that would give U.S. citizens a right to legal redress against
foreign states in limited circumstances.' 8 The Act is the sole
means by which U.S. courts may gain subject matter jurisdic-
tion over claims against a foreign state.' 9 The Act also deline-
ates the specific circumstances under which a foreign govern-
ment may not claim the defense of foreign sovereign immu-
nity. 0
Congress passed the FSIA to resolve the problems inher-
ent in the previous system for determining the scope of foreign
sovereign immunity in U.S. law.2' In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, U.S. federal courts applied federal common law, recog-
18. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Department of State). The 1976 Act was the second attempt to pass a
comprehensive foreign sovereign immunities statute. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6608. In 1973, the House
of Representatives of the 93d Congress, First Session, introduced House of Repre-
sentatives 3493. Id. That bill went as far as a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Claims and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary. Id. How-
ever, after the hearing, the Subcommittee realized that the private bar had not been
fully consulted. Id. In addition, unforeseen problems in the area of maritime cases,
jurisdictional provisions, and attachment and execution became apparent. Id. After
correcting these deficiencies and seeking more consultation from the private bar,
House of Representatives 11315 was introduced during the second session of the
94th Congress. Id. The legislative history of the Act notes that "[H.R. 11315] is
essentially the same bill as was introduced in 1973, except for the technical improve-
ments that have been made in the interim." Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604. The Act "define[s] the jurisdic-
tion of United States courts in suits against foreign states." Id. See Argentine Repub-
lic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (stating that "[w]e
think that the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention that
the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our
courts"); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that "Congress intended the Act to be comprehensive, and courts have con-
sistently so interpreted its provisions"); Meadows v. Dom. Rep., 628 F. Supp. 599,
603 (N.D. Cal.) (stating that "[b]y adopting the FSIA, Congress intended to provide
nationwide and uniform regulations for the maintenance of suits against foreign
states and their entities in the courts of the United States"), aff'd, 817 F.2d 517, cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1988). H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976
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nizing an absolute view of sovereign immunity which ex-
empted foreign states from all suits in U.S. courts.2 2 This ab-
solute theory of sovereign immunity produced hardship for
U.S. citizens involved in contracts with foreign entities or suf-
fering torts committed by foreign entities, because the U.S. cit-
izens simply had no opportunity for legal redress in U.S.
courts.
By the mid-1940s, the U.S. judiciary adopted a less restric-
tive approach to the issue, deferring to the practices and poli-
cies of the U.S. Department of State concerning the propriety
of granting sovereign immunity in suits involving foreign sov-
ereigns.2 3 In Ex Parte Peru, the U.S. Supreme Court explained
that deference to the executive was mandated by the nature of
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604. But see Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The Gibbons court commented that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ... [is] a six-year-old statu-
tory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretative questions engen-
dered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions, has
during its brief lifetime been a financial boon for the private bar but a con-
stant bane of the federal judiciary.
Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1105.
22. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Chief
Justice Marshall stated that because all sovereigns possess "equal rights and equal
independence" under international law, a sovereign enters the territory of a friendly
foreign government "in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his in-
dependent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by impli-
cation, and will be extended to him." Id. at 136-37. Schooner Exchange was a suit
involving a foreign military vessel, but 100 years later the Supreme Court extended
the cloak of immunity to commercial vessels of a foreign state. Berizzi Bros. Co. v.
S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). In Berizzi, the Court stated that:
[t]he principles [of sovereign immunity] are applicable alike to all ships held
and used by a government for a public purpose, and that when, for the pur-
pose of advancing the trade of its people or providing revenue for its treas-
ury, a government acquires, mans and operates ships in the carrying trade,
they are public ships in the same sense that warships are.
Berizzi, 271 U.S. at 574. Thus, the absolute theory of sovereign immunity extended to
all acts of the foreign state whether they were governmental or commercial in nature.
Id.
23. See, e.g., Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Peru demonstrates that the
Court began to view the question of foreign sovereign immunity increasingly as "a
mixed legal and political question with respect to which determinations of the Execu-
tive Branch should be accorded conclusive effect." Williams v. Shipping Corp. of
India, 653 F.2d 875, 877 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). The legis-
lative history of the Act states, as a result of decisions such as Peru, that "[i]n the early
part of this century, the Supreme Court began to place less emphasis on whether
immunity was supported by the law and practice of nations, and relied instead on the
practices and policies of the State Department." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
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foreign sovereign immunity2 4 and separation of powers princi-
pe 25ples.
In 1952, the U.S. Department of State announced its mod-
ification of this practice in the landmark letter from Jack B.
Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting At-
torney General Philip B. Perlman ("Tate Letter"). 6 In the
Tate Letter, the Department of State adopted a legal standard
known as the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,2 7 by
which it advised courts to grant foreign states immunity only
for their public acts and not for actions arising out of their
strictly commercial or private acts.28
Although the Tate Letter's adoption of a legal standard
seemed to represent a retreat from the absolute authority
granted to the Department of State to decide foreign sovereign
immunity questions absent legal standards, the Tate Letter in-
dicated that the Department of State still retained the preroga-
tive to issue recommendations.2 9 The Tate Letter also
24. 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943). In Peru, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
because foreign sovereign immunity is a "matter of grace and comity on the part of
the United States, and not a Constitutional restriction," U.S. courts should automati-
cally defer to suggestions of immunity from the executive branch. Id.
25. Id. at 588 (stating that maintaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign state
by seizing and detaining the property of the foreign state would "embarrass the exec-
utive arm of the Government in conducting foreign relations"); see also Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (holding that "it is ... not for the courts to deny an
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on
new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize").
26. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Act-
ing Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976) (appendix to opinion of White, J.).
27. Id. Mr. Tate's rationale was based on the growing acceptance among na-
tions that a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is better suited to the modern
world in which governments become involved in commercial transactions in and in
which parties may be less willing to contract with governments if the governments
are given absolute immunity for their commercial acts. Id.
28. Id. Mr. Tate described the restricted theory of sovereign immunity as ex-
isting "with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with
respect to private (lure gestionis)." Id. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605; Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp.
1224, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
29. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Act-
ing Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976) (appendix to opinion of White, J.). See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d
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strongly suggested that the courts would be compelled to fol-
low such recommendations.3" Indeed, overriding political
considerations still influenced post-Tate Letter Department of
State decisions regarding sovereign immunity in individual
cases." When "nonfriendly" countries did not seek the aid of
Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6607. The legislative history of
the Act states that
[t]he Tate letter, however, has posed a number of difficulties. From a legal
standpoint, if the [U.S. State] Department applies the restrictive principle in
a given case, it is in the awkward position of a political institution trying to
apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts. Moreover, it
does not have the machinery to take evidence, to hear witnesses, or to afford
appellate review.
Id.
30. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Act-
ing Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T. ST.
BULL. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976) (appendix to opinion of White, J.). Mr. Tate wrote to the acting U.S. Attorney
General that
it will hereafter be the [U.S. State] Department's policy to follow the restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign
governments for a grant of sovereign immunity. It is realized that a shift in
policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is felt that the courts
are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has
declined to do so. There have been indications that at least some justices of
the Supreme Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the branch
of the Government charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign
affairs.
Id.
31. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983). The
Supreme Court in Verlinden stated that "foreign nations often placed diplomatic pres-
sure on the State Department in seeking immunity. On occasion, political considera-
tions led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been
available under the restrictive theory." Id. at 487. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits
Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings on H. R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65
(1976) (statement of Michael H. Cardozo, former legal advisor to the Department of
State and Justice Department, lecturer in international law, and attorney in Washing-
ton, D.C.). Mr. Cardozo illustrated the continued presence of political considera-
tions in granting foreign sovereign immunity, stating that:
[t]he most interesting [example of State Department flexibility] in recent
times, of course, was the case of the Eastern Airlines plane that was hijacked
to Cuba just at the same time that a Cuban vessel was being attached in this
country. And when we approached the Cubans and said, "Surely you're go-
ing to release that plane and its passengers immediately," they said "Oh, of
course, we will, just as soon as you release our ship." And the State Depart-
ment very quickly sent a telegram to the judge in that case and said, "We
suggest immunity," although it was a commercial transaction. The ship was
quickly released and the plane was released.
Id. See Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir.)
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the Department of State and no suggestion of immunity letter
was written, courts decided whether the sovereign should be
immune based on the inconsistent Department of State deci-
sions and the few instances in which courts had interpreted the
restrictive theory. 2
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
1. Departure from the Past
In 1976, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to resolve the difficulties created by the Tate
Letter and to bring the U.S. practice into conformity with that
of other countries.33 The Act provided the first comprehensive
statutory scheme to define subject matter and personal juris-
diction over foreign states.3 4 The FSIA also defined the legal
standards necessary for a foreign defendant to raise a success-
ful claim of foreign sovereign immunity.35
(stating that "[tihe potential harm or embarrassment resulting to our government
from a judicial finding of jurisdiction, in the face of an Executive recommendation to
the contrary, may be just as severe where the foreign sovereign had initially con-
tracted to waive its claim of sovereign immunity as where it had not done so"), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
32. See, e.g., National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 420 F. Supp.
954, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating that "[ilt does not appear that defendants have
requested the State Department to recommend that immunity be granted, nor has
the State Department done so. The determination of this issue rests with the
Court").
33. See Gregorian v. Izvetsia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989). The court
in Gregorian stated that "[iut remains a principal purpose of the FSIA to conform U.S.
immunity practice to virtually every other country in the world, where sovereign im-
munity decision are made exclusively by the courts and not by foreign affairs agen-
cies." Id. See also Martropico Compania Naviera S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 428 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating that
primary purpose of FSIA is to "provide[ ] a unitary rule for determinations of claims
of sovereign immunity in legal actions in the United States, thereby eliminating the
role of the State Department in such questions and bringing the United States into
conformity with the immunity practice of virtually every other country").
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States, 1976: Hearings on H. R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26
(1976) (statements of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State). Mr.
Leigh testified that "the bill would set forth, for the first time, in our judicial code,
comprehensive methods for beginning a lawsuit against a foreign state through ser-
vice of process and for obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign-government de-
fendants." Id.
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d
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In a significant departure from the procedure enunciated
in the Tate Letter, the FSIA vested in U.S. courts full authority
to decide questions of sovereign immunity defenses. 6 Beyond
the issue of personal jurisdiction, the FSIA grants broadened
subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts for matters in-
volving foreign governments.3 7 Under the FSIA, a plaintiff
may initiate a suit in a federal court without regard to tradi-
tional requirements for diversity jurisdiction such as diversity
Sess. 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613. The legislative history
indicates that the FSIA "set[s] forth the legal standards under which Federal and
State courts would henceforth determine all claims of sovereign immunity raised by
foreign states." Id.
36. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988) with Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Adviser, Department of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19,
1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952) and in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (appendix to opinion of White, J.). See H.R. REP.
No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that
[a] principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign
immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing
the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring liti-
gants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds
and under procedures that insure due process. The Department of State
would be freed from pressures from foreign governments to recognize their
immunity from suit and from any adverse consequences resulting from an
unwillingness of the Department to support that immunity.... U.S. immu-
nity practice would conform to the practice in virtually every other coun-
try-where sovereign immunity decisions are made exclusively by the courts
and not by a foreign affairs agency.
Id. See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that
"[t]he Act transferred the determination of immunity to the courts in order to
strengthen the integrity of the legal process by which this determination was made"),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605 (1988). See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig.,
461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) (stating that "Congress deliberately sought to channel
cases against foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and into federal courts,
thereby reducing the potential for a multiplicity of conflicting results among the
courts of the 50 States"); Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Republic of the
Congo to the United Nations, 443 F. Supp. 816, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating that
"[w]hile Congress left open the option to bring actions against foreign states in the
state courts, it clearly intended to encourage the bringing of such actions in federal
courts"); see also Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings
on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1976) (statement of Bruno Ristau,
Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Department ofJustice). Mr. Ristau
testified that "the underlying rationale of the draftsmen of this bill-and I assure you
there was considerable debate-was to develop ... in the future, a consistent body of
Federal law and to place the responsibility primarily in the Federal judiciary." Id. at
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of citizenship or a minimum amount in controversy. 38 As part
of the same scheme to encourage access to federal courts,
Congress amended the removal statute to ease removal from
state courts to federal district courts of suits brought against
foreign states. 9
To limit the application of the defense of foreign sover-
eign immunity, the Act also codified the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity.4" Although the Tate Letter advocated the
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988). This provision conferring jurisdiction created
in the district courts
original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury
civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as
to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is
not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or
under any applicable international agreement.
Id. Prior to the passage of the FSIA, district courts had subject matter jurisdiction in
suits involving foreign states based on diversity jurisdiction. H.R. REP. No. 1487,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988). Section 1441(d) provides that "any civil action
brought in a State court against a foreign state ... may be removed by the foreign
state" to the local district court. This provision allows removal without regard to the
amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship. Id. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in
Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
35 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
During the hearing before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Govern-
mental Relations, Mr. Leigh was questioned about the removal provision which
would allow a foreign state to remove a case to a federal district court filed originally
in a state court. Id. The witness was asked why there is a removal provision rather
than a provision which mandated that all suits against foreign sovereigns be filed in
the federal system. Id. The witness answered that
it was felt that because of existing practice and because there might be some
cases in which the State courts would be satisfactory to the foreign defend-
ant government-we would simply follow the removal procedures available
under other sections of the judicial code.
But I would be frank to admit that this could have gone either way. The
general theory is that it would be better to have these ultimately decided in
the Federal courts so as to produce a more systematic body of case law inter-
preting the provisions of this legislation.
Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988) ("Findings and Declaration of Purpose"). Section
1602 provides that "[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the juris-
diction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and
their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction ofjudgments ren-
dered against them in connection with their commercial activities." Id. See East Eu-
rope Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 386 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating
that "[t]he Act codifies the principle of'restrictive' sovereign immunity in that, under
international law, foreign states are immune from suits based on their public acts, but
not on their commercial or private acts"), aff'd mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979).
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application of the restrictive theory, in practice the recognition
of sovereign immunity remained very much a political, rather
than a legal, decision.4 ' By vesting authority solely with the
courts and by removing it from a political institution, the FSIA
provided the means to apply the restrictive theory.42
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the FSIA
preempts all existing state and federal law.43 As evidence of
this comprehensive intent, Congress included numerous provi-
sions in the FSIA in order to address virtually all procedural
issues that might arise in an action brought against a foreign
state.44 Indeed, some courts have concluded that, based on
the broad scope and preemptive force of the Act, the decisions
involving foreign sovereign immunity made before the effec-
tive date of the FSIA are no longer valid.45
41. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 304 (1986) (discussing
political nature of post-Tate Letter foreign sovereign immunity decisions).
42. See supra notes 36-39 and. accompanying text (discussing granting of exclu-
sive judicial authority to decide issues of foreign sovereign immunity).
43. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610. The legislative history of the Act states that the FSIA
preempts "any other State or Federal law (excluding applicable international agree-
ments) for according immunity to foreign sovereigns, their political subdivisions,
their agencies and their instrumentalities." Id.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1607 ("Counterclaims"); § 1608 ("Service; time to answer;
default"); § 1609 ("Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a for-
eign state"); § 1610 ("Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or execution");
§ 1611 ("Certain types of property immune from execution") (1988).
45. See, e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir.
1990). In Chuidian, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the Act [cannot] reasonably be interpreted to leave intact the pre-1976 com-
mon law with respect to foreign officials.... [N]o authority supports the
continued validity of the pre-1976 common law in light of the Act. Indeed
the American Law Institute recently issued the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law, superseding the Second Restatement[ ] .... The new
restatement deletes in its entirety the discussion of the United States com-
mon law of sovereign immunity, and substitutes a section analyzing such
issues exclusively under the Act.
Id. The Supreme Court supported this view, noting that in the pre-FSIA cases "the
governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly applied." Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). But see Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in
Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
53 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
Mr. Leigh testified that "we have decided to put our faith in the U.S. courts to work
out progressively, on a case-by-case basis, and using such guidance as has already
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2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976:
Legislative Intent and Basic Elements
The U.S. Congress drafted the FSIA using comprehensive
terms46 because it intended that the courts develop a uniform
body of jurisprudence under the FSIA.47 Thus, the Act is the
sole means for adjudicating foreign sovereign immunity deci-
sions in the United States.48 Congress intended that this uni-
form body of jurisprudence produce three effects. First, by
developed in the very large body of case law which exists, on the distinction between
commercial and governmental [acts]." Id.
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 (1989) (referring to "comprehensiveness of the
statutory scheme in the FSIA"). For example, the FSIA changed the means of serv-
ing process and gaining personal jurisdiction over foreign states. 28 U.S.C. at
§ 1602. Prior to the passage of the FSIA, a litigant obtained personal jurisdiction
over a foreign state by attaching the state's property located in the United States. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1608-1611 (1988). See George Kahale III & Matias A. Vega, Immunity and
Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign Siates, 18 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 221 (1979). The FSIA ended this embarrassing practice by pro-
viding in detail the multiple manner of serving a summons and complaint on a for-
eign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988). See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against For-
eign States, 1976: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, 28-29
(1976) (statements of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State). Mr.
Leigh testified that
[the bill will] obviate the necessity of attempting to begin a lawsuit by attach-
ing a foreign government's property. Such attachments are the one area
where an occasional diplomatic problem has arisen in the past.
... As stated in the letter of transmittal to the Speaker of the House
from the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Attorney General, the
broad purposes of the bill are "to facilitate and depoliticize litigation against
foreign states and to minimize irritations in foreign relations arising out of
such litigation."
Id.
47. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199,
1212 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that the FSIA's purpose would best be served by the
"development of a uniform body of [FSIA] law") (citations omitted); Goar v. Compa-
nia Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that "Congress
chose to treat jurisdiction of actions against foreign sovereigns in a uniform and com-
prehensive manner"); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875, 879 (4th
Cir. 1981) (stating that "[b]oth the statutory language and the legislative history
evince the congressional desire to achieve uniformity of decisional law in the area of
suits against foreign sovereigns"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982);Jones v. Shipping
Corp. of India, Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 1260, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that "Congres-
sional intent was to provide a uniform, comprehensive scheme for adjudicating ac-
tions against foreign states in United States' courts").
48. 28 U.S.C. at § 1602.
1072 FORDHAM INTERNA TIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1060
vesting jurisdiction solely with the judiciary, Congress at-
tempted to remove the specter of favoritism often present in
decisions influenced by the U.S. Department of State.49 The
Act provided courts with legal standards by which to adjudi-
cate foreign sovereign immunity decisions.
A second, related, purpose was to conform foreign sover-
eign immunity practice in the United States to that of other
nations.50 Although the United States purported to follow the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity under the pro-
cedures of the Tate Letter, the United States was the only na-
tion in the world to leave the decision-making in the hands of a
political institution. 5'
A final purpose was to provide clear notice to foreign
states regarding the application of the defense of foreign sov-
ereign immunity in U.S. courts. This notice is important for
foreign states that base their own application of sovereign im-
munity on the doctrine of reciprocity,52 because these states
grant sovereign immunity in their courts to defendant foreign
states in the same manner that the defendant foreign states
grant foreign sovereign immunity.
53
49. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6611. The legislative history notes that the "broad jurisdiction
in the Federal courts should be conducive to uniformity in decision, which is desira-
ble since a disparate treatment of cases involving foreign governments may have ad-
verse foreign relations consequences." Id.
50. See supra note 33 (discussing congressional intent that U.S. foreign sovereign
immunities practice conform with practice of other nations); see also Von Dardel v.
U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 253 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that "[t]he Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, like every federal statute, should be interpreted in such a way as to
be consistent with the law of nations"). See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13, 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613 (stating that decisions are to "be
made by the judiciary on the basis of a statutory regime which incorporates standards
recognized under international law"); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem ofJurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign States, 1951 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 251 (1952) (noting that "in
the great majority of states in which there is an articulate practice on the subject the
courts have declined to follow the principle of absolute immunity").
51. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings on H. R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 26-27 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh,
Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State). Mr. Leigh testified that "[in virtually
every other country in the world, sovereign immunity is a question of international
law decided exclusively by the courts and not by institutions concerned with foreign
affairs." Id. at 27.
52. MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 20, at 580-84
(1968) (discussing application of reciprocity principles in foreign countries).
53. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411 (1964); Wil-
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3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Wide
Scope and Attribution of Liability
The FSIA applies to actions involving "foreign states," a
term that the Act defines broadly.54 Thus, the FSIA recognizes
sovereign immunity not only for foreign governments, but also
for individuals who are sued in their official capacities.5" The
FSIA, however, does not affect the status of diplomatic or con-
liams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526, 528 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stating that
"[iln effect, a foreign nation is being accorded the same type.., of reciprocal immu-
nity we would like to be accorded in a foreign court"), af'd, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); see also Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional
Power Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1177
(1985) (stating that "[t]he United States does not plead sovereign immunity in for-
eign courts where a similar claim would not be recognized in the United States").
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988). Section 1603(a) defines "foreign state" as in-
cluding "a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state." Id. An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is
any entity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title nor created under the laws of any third
country.
Id. § 1603(b). See Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm'n, 604 F. Supp. 703, 706
(D.D.C. 1985) (stating that "FSIA substantially equates a 'foreign state' with an
'agent or instrumentality of a foreign state' "); Unidyne Corp. v. Aerolineas Argenti-
nas, 590 F. Supp. 398, 400 (E.D. Va. 1984). In Unidyne, the court held that
[flor an entity to be a separate legal person pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)
... the corporation, association, foundation, or other entity, must be capa-
ble of suing or being sued in its own name, of contracting in its own name,
or of holding property in its own name under the law of the foreign state
where it was created.
Id. Whether an entity is an "agent or instrumentality" pursuant to the FSIA such that
it may invoke sovereign immunity for its own actions should not be confused with the
question of whether the entity's acts can be attributed to the foreign state, thus mak-
ing the foreign state itself liable for the entity's acts. See supra note 8 and accompany-
ing text (discussing definition of attribution of liability).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988). See e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912
F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) (extending FSIA immunity to members of executive agen-
cies of a foreign state); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (extending
FSIA immunity to an Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs); American Bonded Ware-
house v. Air France, 653 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (extending FSIA immunity to
airline employees); Mueller v. Diggelman, No. 82 Civ. 5513 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983)
(extending FSIA immunity to judges and clerks of a foreign court); Rios v. Marshall,
530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (extending FSIA immunity to officials of a state's
labor organization). But see Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793,
797 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that "the terminology of [section 1603(b)]-'agency,'
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sular officials, whose personal immunity from suit is controlled
by international treaties. 6
The FSIA provides that courts have subject matter juris-
diction over an action only if it falls within an exception to im-
munity.57 These exceptions include waiver of immunity,58
suits involving commercial activity,5 9 and suits involving per-
sonal injury; death; or damage to, or loss of, property.6 °
Although the FSIA fully addresses the procedures for
gaining personal and subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign
state, the FSIA does not explicitly prescribe the substantive law
that should apply to an action in which one of the exceptions
applies.6' The Act provides that a foreign state not entitled to
immunity shall be liable "in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances."6 2 U.S.
courts have universally interpreted this mandate to mean that
the forum state's law of liability shall determine the liability of
'instrumentality,' 'entity,' organ-makes it clear that the statute is not intended to
apply to natural persons").
56. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610. The legislative history of the Act states that "[tihe bill is
not intended to affect... either diplomatic or consular immunity." Id. Consular and
diplomatic immunity is determined by the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, and the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. See Gerritsen v. Cordova, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17138
(D.D. Cal. 1988) (discussing immunity of consular officials under Vienna Conven-
tion). However, if a plaintiff seeks to attribute the acts of the diplomatic or consular
official to the foreign state the issue is within the scope of the FSIA because in such
cases the foreign government becomes the defendant. First Fidelity Bank, NA. v.
Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
57. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983). In Verlinden,
the Supreme Court held that "if none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set
forth in the Act applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject matter jurisdic-
tion and personal jurisdiction." Id. at 485 n.5.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988).
59. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
60. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 620 (1983).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988). This provision on the extent of liability provides
in pertinent part that
[als to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled
to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state
shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or
instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages ....
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a foreign state.63
Courts are less consistent, however, in determining the
law to apply in deciding whether the foreign state is amenable
to suit based on the acts of another party.' The term "attribu-
tion of liability" evolved from the FSIA's legislative history.65
Since the passage of the FSIA, U.S. courts have focused on a
narrow aspect of the phrase-the imputation of liability to a
foreign sovereign by means of the common law doctrines of
agency or respondeat superior.66 Although the term respon-
deat superior is usually used in the context of vicarious liability
in a tort action, and agency in the context of a breach of con-
63. See, e.g., Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629 (holding that where state law provides rule of
liability governing private individuals, FSIA requires application of that rule to for-
eign states in like circumstances); see also MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, SOVER-
EIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 53 (1984) (stating that "after a foreign sover-
eign has been found amenable to suit in the United States, matters of contract inter-
pretation and of choice of law do not require the application of a uniform body of
law, i.e., federal common law"); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME
RECENT DEVELOPMENTs 53-54 (1988) (discussing applicable law in tort actions
brought against foreign sovereigns is /x loci commissi which "will invariably be the law
of the forum State").
64. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb.-Perma-
nent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989); Skeen v. Federative Republic of Braz.,
566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983).
65. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610. The legislative history states that the FSIA is not intended
to "affect... the attribution of responsibility between or among entities of a foreign
state; for example, whether the proper entity of a foreign state has been sued, or
whether an entity sued is liable in whole or in part for the claimed wrong." Id.
"Attribution of responsibility" was soon misquoted and became "attribution of liabil-
ity." Bancec, 462 U.S. at 622 n. I1 (stating that "[t]he statute is silent, however, con-
cerning the rule governing the attribution of liability among entities of a foreign
state") (emphasis in original).
66. See Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (discussing attribution of liability in
context of determining if foreign state so extensively controlled instrumentality that
principal-agent-relationship was formed); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic
Republic of Iran, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4055, at *7 (D.D.C. May 5, 1989) (discussing
attribution of acts of instrumentality to foreign state as issue of whether foreign state
"exercised the necessary degree of control over the other defendants to create a
principal/agent relationship and thus permit this court to deem [the foreign state]
responsible for their actions"), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir.
1990); see also Gregorian v. Izvetsia, 658 F. Supp. 1224, 1236 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 871 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989); Hester Int'l v.
The Federal Republic of Nig., 681 F. Supp. 371, 376 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd, 879 F.2d 170
(5th Cir. 1989); Baglab Ltd. v. Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd., 665 F. Supp. 289, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Skeen v. Federative Republic of Braz., 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C.
1983) (discussing Bancec and "allocation of liability" in context of respondeat supe-
rior).
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tract action, both terms are very closely related to one another
and are often used interchangeably.6 7
The FSIA does not directly prescribe the law that is to ap-
ply in determining if an entity is an agent or servant of a for-
eign state for purposes of attributing liability."8 In fact, U.S.
legislators explained that the FSIA was not intended to affect
"attribution of responsibility. '69 This attribution of liability,
however, is often an integral part of an action brought pursu-
ant to the FSIA if the foreign state is sued based on the acts or
omissions of its purported agent. 70 In these cases, the court
must answer the initial question regarding the attribution of
liability before it can find that it has subject matter jurisdiction
over the foreign state pursuant to the FSIA. 7  For example, if
an agent did not have the authority to contract on behalf of the
principal foreign state, the court has no subject matter or per-
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign state under the FSIA.72
67. See supra note 7 (discussing similarities between agency and respondeat su-
perior).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988). The Act discusses respondeat superior in
terms of obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign. Id. Section
1605(a)(5) states that a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States or States in any case
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal in-
jury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United
States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of
any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of
his office or employment ....
Id. The Act is silent on the choice of law to be applied to determine these questions.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
69. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610. See supra note 65.
70. See, e.g., Koeppel & Koeppel v. The Federal Republic of Nig., 704 F. Supp.
521 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that plaintiff may proceed against foreign state for acts
of its consular officials).
71. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438,
447 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that "absent an agency relationship, the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign state for the acts of its instrumentality");
Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Texas Trading & Mill-
ing Corp. v. The Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir.) (stating that
"it is not only defendant's activities in the forum, but also actions relevant to the
transaction by an agent on defendant's behalf, which support personal jurisdiction"),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra,
467 F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating that "activities of an agent may be attrib-
uted to the principal for jurisdictional purposes"), aff'd mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1979); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506 (1970).
72. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent Mis-
sion, 877 F.2d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1989).
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C. First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba
In 1983, the Supreme Court in Bancec rendered the sole
decision in which it addressed the question of choice of law to
determine attribution of liability in an action under the FSIA
involving a suit between a New York bank and a Cuban bank.73
In Bancec, the main issue before the Court concerned whether
an instrumentality of the Cuban government could escape the
sovereign's liabilities. 74  The determination of this question
depended on the legal relationship between the defendant
bank and the government of Cuba.75
In 1960, Bancec was an official credit institution in Cuba
with extensive connections to the Cuban government. 6
Bancec attempted to collect on a letter of credit issued by First
National City Bank of New York.77 Shortly after First National
received Bancec's request, the Cuban government nationalized
the Cuban properties of First National.7 ' Bancec instituted a
suit against First National to collect on the letter of credit, and
First National counterclaimed, arguing that it had the right to
73. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
74. Id. at 619-20. See generally Raquel A. Rodriguez, Comment, Holding Foreign
Government Corporations Liable for the Wrongs of the Government: A Clash Among Competing
Policies, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (1985).
75. Bancec, 426 U.S. at 613-14.
76. Id. The Supreme Court noted that
Bancec was established by Law No. 793, of April 25, 1960, as the legal suc-
cessor to the Banco Cubano del Comercio Exterior (Cuban Foreign Trade
Bank), a trading bank established by the Cuban Government in 1954 and
jointly owned by the Government and private banks. Law No. 793 contains
detailed "By-laws" specifying Bancec's purpose, structure, and administra-
tion. Bancec's stated purpose was "to contribute to, and collaborate with,
the international trade policy of the Government and the application of the
measures concerning foreign trade adopted by" . . . Cuba's central bank
.... Bancec was empowered to act as the Cuban Government's exclusive
agent in foreign trade. The Government supplied all of its capital and
owned all of its stock. The General Treasury of the Republic received all of
Bancec's profits, after deduction of amounts for capital reserves. A Gov-
erning Board consisting of delegates from Cuban governmental ministries
governed and managed Bancec. Its president was ... [the] Minister of State
and president of Banco Nacional. A General Manager appointed by the
Governing Board was charged with directing Bancec's day-to-day opera-
tions in a manner consistent with its enabling statute.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 613.
78. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 614 (1983).
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set off the amount seized by the Cuban government against the
letter of credit. 79 After the suit commenced, the Cuban gov-
ernment dissolved Bancec and divided its capital among Banco
Nacional, which also received all of Bancec's rights, claims, as-
sets and obligations related to banking, and other governmen-
tal associations.8"
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court determined that
Bancec was not entitled to sovereign immunity based on the
counterclaim exception of the FSIA. 8 1 After determining that
Bancec was not immune, the Court considered the liability of
Bancec for the acts of the Cuban government. 82 The Court
held that the liability of Cuba could be attributed to Bancec
under the FSIA.8 s The Court did not apply choice of law rules,
but rather followed its own two-step analysis. 84
First, the Court considered the extent to which the FSIA
would influence its analysis. The question of the attribution of
liability is a threshold question that the FSIA does not ad-
dress.85 The Court reasoned that the FSIA did not control the
issue because the language and history of the FSIA provide
that the Act does not affect the substantive law of liability nor
the attribution of liability among instrumentalities of a foreign
state.86 Although the Court considered itself free of any FSIA-
imposed constraints, it nonetheless stated that it remained
cognizant of the congressional policies guiding the FSIA.8 7
79. Id. at 615.
80. Id.
81. Id. The counterclaim exception of the FSIA provides in pertinent part that
[i]n any action brought by a foreign state ... in a court of the United States
or of a State, the foreign state shall not be accorded immunity with respect
to any counterclaim-(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek
relief exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the for-
eign state.
28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1988). Because Bancec brought the suit against First National,
and First National instituted a counterclaim for the amount of the set-off, the Court
denied immunity to Bancec under the counterclaim exception. Bancec, 462 U.S. at
620-21.
82. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 621.
83. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 21 (1983).
84. Id. See Clyde H. Crockett, Choice-of-Law and the Liability of Foreign States, 4
CONN. J. INT'L L. 91, 119 (1988) (observing absence of choice of law analysis in
Bancec).
85. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
86. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 622 n. 11.
87. Id. at 621.
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Second, the Court considered the law that would deter-
mine the question of Bancec's juridical status.88 The Court be-
gan by rejecting the application of Cuban law, the law of the
state that established Bancec.8 9 Citing section 302 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Court held that the law
of the state of incorporation does not apply to disputes involv-
ing the rights of third parties external to the corporation.9 °
Bancec argued that the Court should apply the choice of
law rules of the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) because the
FSIA contained a provision with language similar to a provi-
sion in the FTCA.91' The Supreme Court acknowledged that,
like the FTCA, the FSIA states that a foreign state not entitled
to immunity would be "liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances."'9 2 However, the Court distinguished the substantive
law of liability from the law governing the attribution of liabil-
ity.93 It noted that the FSIA is silent regarding the law to apply
to determine whether a foreign state is amenable to suit based
on the acts of another party.94 Citing the congressional poli-
cies seeking uniformity, the Court held that state common law
88. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983).
89. Id. at 621-22.
90. Id. at 621 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971)). The
Court noted that such a rule would "permit the state to violate with impunity the
rights of third parties under international law while effectively insulating itself from
liability in foreign courts." Id. at 622; but see Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York v.
Republic of Palau, 657 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying law of Palau to de-
termine whether President of Palau had acted ultra vires in pledging treasury of Palau
in financing agreement).
91. Id. at 622. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (reprinted at supra note 62) with 28
U.S.C. § 2674 (stating that "[tlhe United States shall be liable... in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages").
92. Id. at 622 n. 11. Thus, the Court held that "where state law provides a rule
of liability governing private individuals, the FSIA requires the application of that
rule to foreign states in like circumstances." Id. See Crockett, supra note 84, at 98
(stating FSIA extent of liability provision does not become operative until foreign
state has been found liable). But see Desmond T. Barry, Jr., Solving Choice of Law
Problems In Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Cases, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 255, 264 (1988)
(stating that "section 1606 provides a general choice of law rule directing that the
foreign state's liability is to be determined by the law of the place where the event
giving rise to the liability occurred").
93. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.l1 (1983).
94. Id.
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should not apply in determining this question.95 Thus, it also
rejected New York common law.9 6
After rejecting the laws of Cuba as the state that estab-
lished the instrumentality, and New York common law as the
law of the forum, the Court applied federal common law and
international law.9 7 In reaching this choice of law, the Court
considered the practical effect of creating separate legal per-
sonalities such as Bancec.98 The Court stressed that like a pri-
vate corporation, a foreign state creates independent enter-
prises to promote economic development and limit liability.99
Even though the Court had declined to apply the law of the
state that created the instrumentality,'0 0 it found that both in-
ternational law and the congressional intent expressed in the
FSIA supported deference to Cuba's objectives in creating the
instrumentality.10 ' Thus, the Court held, Bancec was a juridi-
cally separate governmental instrumentality because the gov-
ernment had established Bancec as a separate entity. 0 2
The Court did not end its analysis with its conclusion that
Bancec was a juridically separate instrumentality under federal
common and international law. The Court reasoned that even
95. Id. The Court stated that "matters bearing on the Nation's foreign relations
'should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.' " Id.
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). The Court
also noted that "Congress expressly acknowledged the 'importance of developing a
uniform body of law' concerning the amenability of a foreign sovereign to suit in
United States courts." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 32,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6631).
96. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 622 n. 11.
97. Id. at 623. The Court stated that "the principles governing this case are com-
mon to both international law and federal common law, which in these circumstances
is necessarily informed both by international law principles and by articulated con-
gressional policies." Id. See Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 742 (1939) (stating that "[iln all
cases where the [U.S. Supreme Court] has had to apply international law, it has found
the sources in 'the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these
[it has had resort] to the works of jurists and commentators' ") (citing The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
98. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 24-26 (1983).
99. Id. at 626.
100. See supra note 89.
101. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626 n.18, The Court found authority for its position in
decisions of British courts. Id. The Court also cited the legislative history of the
FSIA, and in particular, the provision entitled "Exception to the Immunity from At-
tachment or Execution." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1988)).
102. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 628.
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if Bancec was presumed to be separate under local law, this
presumption might be overcome if Bancec is under govern-
ment control to the extent that a principal-agent relationship
might be said to exist.'0 3 The Court invoked internationally
recognized equitable principles in stressing that it would not
give effect to the corporate form if doing so would result in an
injustice or fraud. °4 Applying these principles to the case, the
Court concluded that blind adhesion to the corporate form
would permit the foreign state to benefit unfairly from the ju-
ridically separate status of its instrumentality. 05  The Court
thus found that Bancec was accountable for the acts of the gov-
ernment of Cuba.10 6
II. CONFLICTING CHOICES OF LA W
Many courts have followed Bancec in applying federal com-
mon law to determine whether the acts of an agent can be at-
tributed to the foreign state. 0 7 One court, however, declined
to apply federal common law to the agency question.10 8 In
contrast to these cases concerning agency relationships are the
cases concerning respondeat superior, another, very similar,
method of attributing liability to a foreign state for the acts of
103. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 29 (1983) (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361
U.S. 398, 402-04 (1960)). See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926)
(Cardozo, J.) (holding that "[d]ominion may be so complete, interference so obtru-
sive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidi-
ary an agent").
104. Id. at 629-30 (citing Anderson v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1944); Tay-
lor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939); Pepper v. Littion, 308 U.S. 295,
310 (1939)). See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 794 (2d. Cir. 1984)
(stating that "message [of Bancec] is that foreign states cannot avoid their obligations
by engaging in abuses of corporate form"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985). The
Court stated that the decision
announces no mechanical formula for determining the circumstances under
which the normally separate juridical status of a government instrumentality
is to be disregarded. Instead, it is the product of the application of interna-
tionally recognized equitable principles to avoid the injustice that would re-
sult from permitting a foreign state to reap the benefits of our courts while
avoiding the obligations of international law.
Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633-34.
105. Id. at 633.
106. Id.
107. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying
federal common law).
108. See infra notes 128-59 and accompanying text (discussing First Fidelity
Bank, N.A. v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda-Permanent Mission).
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its servants. 0 9 All courts faced with the respondeat superior
issue have held that state common law controls." 0
A. Federal Common Law Approach
In the aftermath of Bancec, courts and commentators have
disagreed regarding the propriety of applying the choice of law
rule established in Bancec to all attribution of liability issues. 1 '
In Bancec, the Supreme Court applied federal common law to
determine whether a juridically separate, wholly-owned gov-
ernment corporation could escape the liabilities of its govern-
ment. 112 The plaintiff sought to attribute the liabilities of the
principal foreign state to its agent in an action brought against
the agent.' In these "downward attribution"'' 4 cases, courts
uniformly apply federal common law to determine if a princi-
109. See supra note 7 (discussing similarities between respondeat superior and
agency).
110. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text (discussing respondeat supe-
rior cases).
111. Some commentators have subscribed to the position that the choice of law
rule in Bancec applies to all attribution of liabilities issues. See, e.g., William C. Hoff-
man, The Separate Entity Rule in International Perspective: Should State Ownership of Corpo-
rate Shares Confer Sovereign Status for Immunity Purposes?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 535, 577 (199 1)
(stating that "[a]llocation issues are governed by international and federal common
law"). Others disagree. See MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY IN
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 6.19 (1991) (discussing Bancec's choice of law rule as
limited to veil piercing); GRusoN & REISNER, supra note 63, at 53 (stating that the rule
of Bancec concerns "whether the separate juridical status of an instrumentality of a
foreign state should be respected by a U.S. court"). See Rodriguez, supra note 74
(criticizing as too narrow Bancec's substantive holding on attribution of liability);
Irene Cannon-Geary, Comment, Piercing the Veil of Foreign Trade Organizations, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483 (1985) (criticizing Bancec for not providing guidance to
courts as to when to pierce the corporate veil ofjuridically separate government in-
strumentalities); Mark M. Christopher, Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil Between Foreign
Governments and State Enterprises: A Comparison of Judicial Resolutions in Great Britain and
the United States, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (1985) (criticizing Bancec for its lack of stan-
dards); Ronald D. Lee, Comment,Jurisdiction Over Foreign States for Acts of Their Instru-
mentalities: A Model for Attributing Liability, 94 YALE L.J. 394, 401 (1984) (criticizing
Bancec because "[tlhe ambiguity of the FSIA, the undeveloped nature of federal com-
mon law, and uncertainty about the application of equitable principles raise the dan-
ger that decisionmakers will invoke equity in ways difficult to predict or regularize").
112. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 632-34 (1983).
113. Id. at 621.
114. The author of this Note employs the terms "upward" and "downward"
attribution of liability to illustrate the differences and similarities among post-Bancec
cases. "Downward" attribution of liability occurs when the acts of the foreign state
are attributed to its servant or agent. "Upward" attribution is the reverse, when the
acts of the servant or agent are attributed to the foreign state.
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pal-agent relationship exists between the foreign state and its
instrumentality. 115
In contrast, the situation that is the reverse of Bancec arises
in most FSIA cases. "Upward attribution" of liability occurs
when litigants seek to attribute the liability of the instrumental-
ity to the foreign state based on the common law doctrine of
agency. 16 Courts have reached inconsistent results in these
upward attribution cases.' 1 7
Typical of the upward attribution cases following Bancec is
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran.1 II In Foremost-
McKesson, a U.S. business sued the government of Iran, alleg-
ing that the government had acted through its agents and in-
strumentalities to exclude it from the management of the com-
pany and to withhold the U.S. business' share of earnings." 9
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dis-
115. See, e.g., Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. Arg., 821 F.2d 559 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (applying
federal common law to determine whether foreign state's waiver of immunity applied
to wholly owned corporation under doctrine of agency); De Letelier v. Republic of
Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 794 (2d. Cir. 1984) (applying rules of Bancec to determine
whether liabilities of foreign state may be raised against national airline), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
116. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Ant. & Barb.-Perma-
nent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
117. Compare Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 905
F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Hester Int'l Corp. v. The Federal Republic of Nig., 879
F.2d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying federal common law when imputing acts of
Nigerian corporation and political subdivision to government of Nigeria); Kalamazoo
Spice Extraction Company v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist Eth., 616
F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (applying federal common law when imputing
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction of Ethiopian corporation to government
of Ethiopia) with First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Per-
manent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989) (declining to apply federal common law
to agency issue).
118. 905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
119. Id. at 439. An earlier action brought by the plaintiff was dismissed pursu-
ant to an U.S. Executive Order which required that the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal first consider the claims. Id. at 441. The Claims Tribunal eventually ruled
partially in plaintiff's favor based on claims accruing until 1981. Id. The court in
Foremost-McKesson noted that
the Claims Tribunal concluded that interference with Foremost's rights had
not, by January 19, 1981, amounted to an expropriation. However, the
Claims Tribunal concluded that Pak Dairy had unlawfully withheld from
Foremost cash dividends declared in 1979 and 1980, and it therefore
awarded Foremost approximately $900,000, plus interest, against Iran. The
Claims Tribunal also concluded that Pak Dairy unlawfully failed to deliver to
Foremost stock certificates representing stock dividends declared in 1980
and that Pak Dairy had breached contractual obligations in failing to pay
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miss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA. t2° The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion in part, but re-
manded it on the question of the choice of law used to deter-
mine attribution of liability.' 2' Under the Algiers Accord, Iran
is liable for the acts of its governmental agencies or instrumen-
talities if the government is a majority shareholder and has ma-
jority control of the board of directors. 122 The court of ap-
peals found these factors to be relevant in determining
whether the government of Iran could be held liable for the
acts of its agencies or instrumentalities; however, it did not be-
lieve that the factors were conclusive. 12 3 Citing Bancec's defer-
ence to the foreign state's need to create instrumentalities with
separate legal identities, the court held that Bancec's choice of
law rule controls. 24 The court of appeals ordered the district
court to apply federal common law and principles of interna-
tional law to determine this attribution of liability question. 25
rental payments due and to return upon demand certain machines to Fore-
most.
Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 441 (citations omitted). Plaintiff revived its action
against the defendants for damages arising from expropriations made after January
19, 1981. Id. at 442.
120. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4055 (D.D.C. 1989).
121. Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 446. The court stated that
we conclude that the question of attribution under FSIA is not, as the Dis-
trict Court concluded, the 'same question, or at least a very similar' question
to the one decided in Foremost's favor by the Claims Tribunal. Thus, we
must remand to the District Court so that it may make further factual deter-
minations in light of the more rigorous attribution standard required by
FSIA.
Id. at 445-46 (citation omitted).
122. Algiers Accords, art. VII 3, reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 223
(1981).
123. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438,
448 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The court stated that "[m]ajority shareholding and majority
control of a board of directors, without more, are not sufficient to establish a rela-
tionship of principal to agent under FSIA. See, e.g., Bancec, 462 U.S. at 614, 620-21,
623, 103 S. Ct. at 2593, 2596-97, 2598 (looking to principles of international law and
federal common law to determine when instrumentalities should not be treated as
distinct from the sovereign-though the government owned all the stock and ap-
pointed delegates from governmental ministries to all positions on the Governing
Board)." Id.
124. Id. The FSIA contains a presumption "that a foreign state and agencies
and instrumentalities thereof are separate juridical identities under FSIA." Id.
125. Id. at 448.
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B. State Common Law Approach
In contrast to Bancec and its progeny are the cases apply-
ing state common law to determine attribution of liability.
These cases fall into two categories. The first category is char-
acterized by the decisional approach of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit which has invoked state common
law to determine whether an agent possessed apparent author-
ity to contract on behalf of his principal. 2 6 The second cate-
gory involves the decisions in which courts have consistently
applied state common law rather than federal common law to
determine questions of respondeat superior despite the fact
that respondeat superior and agency are closely related doc-
trines. 127
1. Agency
In contrast to Bancec and Foremost-McKesson, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has endorsed the position
that state common law controls the determination of agency
issues in FSIA cases.' 28 In First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government
of Antigua & Barbuda-Permanent Mission, a 1989 decision, the
Second Circuit "assumed without deciding" that state com-
mon law controls principal-agent relationships. 29
The "agent" in First Fidelity was an ambassador to the
United Nations from Antigua & Barbuda. s ° The ambassador
borrowed US$250,000 from a commercial lender ostensibly
for the purpose of renovating his country's Permanent Mission
in New York City.' He signed the loan agreement in his ca-
pacity as ambassador to the United Nations, 3 2 but subse-
126. See infra notes 128-59 and accompanying text (discussing First Fidelity
Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Antigua & Barbuda-Permanent Mission).
127. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text (discussing respondeat supe-
rior cases).
128. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989).
129. Id. at 194 n.3.
130. Id. at 191-92. The full title of the ambassador was "Ambassador Extraordi-
nary and Plenipotentiary" and he occupied the highest rank in diplomacy, as estab
lished by the Congresses of Vienna (1815) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1818). Id. at 192.
131. Id. at 191.
132. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 1989). Ambassador Jacobs signed the loan
agreement as ambassador, "representing the 'Government of Antigua & Barbuda-
Permanent Mission.'" Id.
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quently used the money for personal purposes.
13 3
After the ambassador ceased repayment on the loan,
plaintiff bank commenced a suit against the Government of
Antigua & Barbuda. 3 4 The bank obtained a default judgment
pursuant to the FSIA' 5 from the district court and sought to
freeze Antigua & Barbuda's bank accounts in New York.'1 6
Nine months after the default judgment was entered in favor of
the bank, the ambassador wrote to the district court acknowl-
edging the debt.' 37 The ambassador and the bank then en-
tered into a settlement agreement and a signed consent order
which waived the defense of sovereign immunity.' 38 The am-
bassador signed the agreement on behalf of the Government
of Antigua & Barbuda in his official capacity. 13
9
Four months after signing the consent order, the ambassa-
dor again defaulted on the settlement agreement.' 40 Again,
First Fidelity moved to attach a New York account held by the
Government of Antigua & Barbuda and to attach accounts held
by the Government of Antigua & Barbuda in Washington,
D.C.' 4 ' In defending against the attachment, the Government
of Antigua & Barbuda took its first action in the case.' 4' The
sovereign moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA, or in the alternative, to vacate the
consent order. 14 3
The Government of Antigua & Barbuda argued that the
ambassador lacked authority either to sign commercial loans
133. Id. at 197 (Newman, J., dissenting). After borrowing the money, "[Ambas-
sadorJacobs] subsequently used the funds for construction of a casino resort in Anti-
gua, in which he and other officials of the Antiguan government held ownership in-
terests." Id.
134. Id. at 191.
135. Brief for Appellee at 2, 6-7, First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Goverment of
Ant. & Barb.-Permanent Mission, 877 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-7863).
136. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1989).
137. Id. at 191-92.
138. Id. at 191.
139. Id. The agreement was also signed by an individual who stated he was an
attorney for the Government of Antigua & Barbuda. Id.
140. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 1989).
141. Id. The bank account in New York contained only US$500.00. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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on behalf of the government or to consent to the settlement.14 4
Thus, the foreign government claimed that it was not bound
by the ambassador's acts because they were beyond the scope
of his authority.' 4 5 The district court denied the motion, and
the government appealed.' 46
One issue on appeal was whether the ambassador pos-
sessed the requisite authority to borrow money on behalf of
the government. 4 7 The bank argued that the ambassador, by
virtue of his high diplomatic standing, possessed either actual
or apparent authority to bind his government to both the loan
agreement and the subsequent consent order. 48 The court re-
jected this broad view of authority which would bind the gov-
ernment solely on the basis of the ambassador's high diplo-
matic position. 149 Instead, the court discussed the powers and
sources of power of diplomatic officials as an issue of
agency. 50  The court cited section 207(c) of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations,' 5' which discusses the liabilities of a
state for the actions or inactions of its employees or agents. 52
Because this section applies elements of agency law, the court
held that the relationship between the ambassador and his
144. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 1989).
145. Id.
146. Id. The court applied "agency law to hold Antigua could not interpose
sovereign immunity.., because the loan fell within the Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Act's commercial activity exception." Id.
147. Id. at 190-91.
148. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 1989).
149. Id. at 192. The court held that "[w]e do not believe . . . that a person's
position as ambassador, and nothing more, should be dispositive in this case, let
alone all cases." Id. at 192.
150. Id. at 192-94.
151. Id. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 207 states that "[a]
state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under international law result-
ing from action or inaction by . . . any organ, agency, official, employee, or other
agent of a government or of any political subdivision, acting within the scope of au-
thority or under color of such authority." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS § 207 (1987). The court pointed out that the Restatement would not apply to
the situation at hand because breach of a commercial contract is not a violation of
international law "unless the breach is discriminatory, or it occurs for governmental
rather than commercial reasons and the state is not prepared to pay damages for the
breach." First Fidelity, 877 F.2d at 193 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS § 712(2) cmt. h & Reporters' Note 8).
152. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1989).
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home country was properly understood as one of agent and
principal. 53
Having defined the issue as one of principal-agent, the
court proceeded to the choice of law question. 154 The court
concluded that it would apply the agency law of New York.'55
The court noted that it was "assuming without deciding" that
state common law controls; however, it nonetheless rejected
the application of federal common law in its decision. 56 In
support of its position that state common law applied, the
court cited Bancec for the proposition that the FSIA does not
affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign
state.15
7
In applying the law to the facts, the court held that
although the ambassador's official title was not dispositive as
to his authority, it was an element to be considered in deter-
mining whether the bank had been reasonable in relying on
the authority under New York agency law.' 58 The circuit court
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court held that "[t]he facts of a given case must be examined, and
the agency law of developed states, here our own, provides the proper framework for
that examination." Id. Although the majority cited Bancec for the proposition that
"the [FSIA] does not affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign
state," it failed to discuss the subsequent holding of Bancec that federal common law
controlled attribution of liability. Id. at 194 n.3. See supra note 86. The majority
rejected federal common law, but stated that "we do not believe that the federal
common law rule, were we to follow the suggestion in Judge Newman's dissent),
would be any different." Id.
156. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. The Government of Ant. & Barb.-Permanent
Mission, 877 F.2d 189, 194 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 194. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jon 0. Newman was most con-
cerned with the implications of the majority's choice of law determination. Id. at 197
(Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman wrote that
[t]hough foreign states, if amenable to suit in this country, may, in most
circumstances, be obliged to accept state substantive law that normally ap-
plies to such matters as contracts and creditors' rights, they are entitled to
expect that this country will have a uniform body of federal law that deter-
mines those issues of agency law that implicate relationships between a for-
eign government and its ambassador accredited within this country.
Id. Judge Newman argued that foreign states are entitled to expect that the United
States has a uniform body of federal law to determine attribution of liability, particu-
larly when these questions affect diplomatic relations. Id. at 197. Citing Bancec,
Judge Newman stated that because the FSIA was silent and no other legislation ad-
dressed the issue, federal common law was appropriate to determine attribution of
liability. Id. Judge Newman observed that under the majority's view, New York com-
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remanded the case, ordering the district court to examine the
circumstances of the transaction to determine whether the per-
son relying on the apparent authority fulfilled his "duty of in-
quiry." 159
2. Respondeat Superior
Like the question of agency, the doctrine of respondeat
superior involves the attribution of liability to the foreign
state.' 6 ° The FSIA, however, indirectly mentions the doctrine
of respondeat superior. 16' All courts that have addressed this
choice of law question agree that state common law controls
with respect to respondeat superior based on an analogy be-
tween language in the FTCA and the FSIA. 6 2
The respondeat superior cases evolve from a pre-FSIA de-
cision completely unrelated to the issue of sovereign immunity
for foreign governments. In 1955, over twenty years prior to
the passage of the FSIA, the Supreme Court held in Williams v.
United States ' 65 that under the FTCA, state law principles of re-
spondeat superior control in determining whether a soldier
had acted within the scope of employment.
The first case concerning the choice of law in respondeat
superior issues under the FSIA was Castro v. Saudi Arabia."6 In
Castro, the District Court for the Western District of Texas con-
sidered whether Saudi Arabia could be sued under the FSIA
for a car accident negligently caused by an off-duty Saudi Ara-
bian soldier in Texas.' 65 Citing Williams, the court concluded
mon law required that the bank exercise a duty of inquiry to the principal foreign
state. Id. Foreign states would not welcome such an inquiry from a U.S. vendor, he
argued. Id.
159. Id. at 195 (citing Ford v. Unity Hosp., 32 N.Y.2d 464, 472, 299 N.E.2d 659,
664, 346 N.Y.S.2d 238, 244 (1973)).
160. See supra note 7 (discussing similarities between respondeat superior and
agency).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988). See supra note 68 (stating text of
§ 1605(a)(5)).
162. See, e.g.,Joseph v. Office of Consulate General of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 1025
(9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[tihe 'scope of employment' provision of the tortious
activity exception [of the FSIA] essentially requires a finding that the doctrine of
respondeat superior applies to the tortious acts of individuals"), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
905 (1988).
163. 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
164. 510 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
165. Id. at 311.
10891991-1992]
1090 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1060
that it should apply state common law to determine whether
the soldier was acting within the scope of his duty when the
accident occurred. 166
Three years later, the District of Columbia District Court
relied on Castro in Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil. 167 In
Skeen, the grandson of the Brazilian ambassador to the United
States had assaulted and shot the plaintiff outside a night-
club.' 68 The court considered whether the tortious acts of the
ambassador's grandson could be attributed to the government
of Brazil, thereby making it liable for damages under the
FSIA.169 The court cited Castro for the proposition that state
law controlled on this point. 170 The court pointed out that the
federal interests implicated in foreign sovereign immunity
questions are limited.' 71 Thus, the court held that if a state's
law provides a rule of civil liability such as assault and battery,
the court should follow the applicable state law. 172
166. Id. The court did not provide a rationale for its application of FTCA prin-
ciples to the FSIA, nor did it discuss the preemptive powers of the FSIA. See supra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing preemptive effect of FSIA).
167. 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983).
168. Id. at 1416.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1417.
171. Id. The Skeen court held that
[t]he [Supreme] Court [has] held that federal interests in foreign affairs and
regulation of foreign commerce provide sufficient basis for federal jurisdic-
tion in all cases against foreign states, including those that involve no sub-
stantive federal issues beyond the question of sovereign immunity. How-
ever, as a general rule, only the purely federal question of sovereign immu-
nity is to be decided on the basis of federal law ....
Id. But see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1963) (holding
that "an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function
of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law").
172. Id. To support this proposition, the court cited Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 622
n.1 1 (1983). Bancec stressed, however, that the question of attribution of liability is a
separate matter. Id. In Skeen, the court misquoted the critical language in Bancec and
characterized the Supreme Court opinion regarding the attribution of liability as a
question of "allocation of liability among instrumentalities." d. Rather than "alloca-
tion of liability," the Supreme Court referred to "attribution of liability." d. The
distinction between the two words is critical. "Allocate" means "to apportion for a
specific purpose to particular persons or things." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 30 (1981). "Attribute" means "to regard as a characteristic of a person or
thing." Id. Skeen's conclusion that it could not "allocate" because there was only one
defendant before the court was an incorrect characterization of Bancec. The correct
term, however, is attribution, and attribution does not depend on the number of
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In Skeen, the court reasoned that there was no question of
allocating liability among multiple parties because the foreign
state was the only defendant.' 73 Citing Bancec, the court held
that federal common law applies only to the purely federal
question of sovereign immunity and not to the rules of liabil-
ity.' 74 Finally, the court looked to Castro's choice of law and
applied state common law to the case.' 75
III. A PROPOSAL FOR APPLYING FEDERAL COMMON LA W
. U.S. courts should apply federal common law whether the
attribution of liability to foreign states is accomplished on the
basis of agency or respondeat superior. First, although Con-
gress did not specifically mandate that federal common law ap-
ply to determine the attribution of liability, the intent of the
Act, the goal of reciprocity among nations, and the provisions
of the FSIA support the application of a uniform federal com-
mon law for determining the attribution of liability. Second,
the decisions that have applied state common law have done so
as a result of a misinterpretation of language common to both
the FTCA and the FSIA. Finally, the application of divergent
principles is antithetical to standards of international law.
A. Congressional Intent Indicates That Courts Should Apply Federal
Common Law to Determine the Attribution of Liability
The legislative history of the FSIA is replete with refer-
defendants before the court. But see Barry, supra note 92, at 261 (approving of Sheen's
analysis of Bancec).
173. Sheen, 566 F. Supp at 1417 n.4. The court held that "[n]o such allocational
issue arises in this case, in which the state of Brazil is the sole defendant and none of
its corporate instrumentalities or political subdivisions has been sued." Id.
174. Id. at 1417.
175. Id. Subsequent to Sheen, other cases have relied on its authority to support
their conclusion that state common law controls with respect to the issue of respon-
deat superior. See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) (ap-
plying state common law in suit between widow of Taiwanese historian and Republic
of China for wrongful death and damages to widow), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct.
27 (1990); Joseph v. Office of Consulate General of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988) (applying state common law in suit be-
tween landlord and office of Consulate General of Nigeria, Federal Republic of Nige-
ria and consular officials for damages caused by consular officials who had leased
plaintiff's home).
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ences to the goal of uniformity.' 76 Arguably, if the goal of uni-
formity were to be followed to its extreme, courts should apply
a single body of law with respect to substantive issues of liabil-
ity such as torts or contract rights. However, no court has
taken such a broad approach to uniformity. In fact, in Bancec,
the Court expressly noted that with respect to "substantive is-
sues of law" courts should apply the appropriate state common
law. 177
However, the issue of uniformity is critical when determin-
ing the amenability of a foreign sovereign to suit based on the
acts of its employees or agents.' 78 In this narrow context, uni-
formity by means of the application of federal common law
serves a two-fold purpose. First, foreign governments and
government-owned businesses invest heavily in the United
States, and the foreign governments conducting business in
the United States must act through a network of agents or em-
ployees. 179 At any given time, the foreign state may not know
the location of these representatives. If courts applied state
common law to determine whether the acts of these agents or
servants are attributable to the foreign state, the foreign state
may be subject to liability based on possibly fifty divergent
rules of respondeat superior or agency.' 0
Second, the application of a uniform body of law provides
176. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussing congressional goal
of uniformity).
177. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 623 n. 11 (1984) (stating that "where state law pro-
vides a rule of liability governing private individuals, the FSIA requires the applica-
tion of that rule to foreign states in like circumstances").
178. By essentially applying two separate bodies of law to the same action,
courts will be using the choice of law technique known as dipe age. See generally Willis
L.M. Reese, Dipeqage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58
(1973). Professor Reese writes that
[dipecage occurs where the rules of one legal system are applied to regulate
certain issues arising from a given transaction or occurrence, while those of
another system regulate the other issues. The technique permits a more
nuanced handling of certain multistate situations and thus forwards the pol-
icy of aptness.
Id.
179. See Steve D. Bezirganian, U.S. Business Enterprises Acquired or Established by
Foreign Direct Investors in 1989, in SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, May 1990, at 23.
180. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d
1199, 1212 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[d]isunity is directly proportional to the
number of authorities speaking on any subject"). But see GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE
IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTIC AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 88 (1984). Mr. Badr argues that for-
eign states do not need notice of a single standard because they choose to conduct
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notice to foreign states that practice reciprocity. When it en-
acted the FSIA, Congress recognized the implications associ-
ated with decisions involving foreign sovereign immunity.' 8'
The legislators were aware that some foreign states based their
system of sovereign immunity on reciprocity. 82 If U.S. courts
apply state common law to determine attribution of liability,
foreign states will not know whether they are subject to the
liability of their instrumentalities until after the harm has oc-
curred. When an instrumentality or agent of the United States
appears as a defendant in an action in the foreign state's
courts, the foreign state will subject the United States to the
same ambiguity regarding the defense of sovereign immunity,
if the state practices reciprocity. To avoid this problem, courts
should apply federal common law to determine the limited
question of attribution of liability.
Some courts have not been swayed by the degree to which
business in the United States and should therefore be subject to the laws of the
United States as are private individuals. Mr. Badr argues that
[i]t should make no difference whether the party to a transnational relation-
ship of private law is a foreign state or a foreign individual orjuristic person.
A state embarking on transnational activities normally governed by private
law should be expected to realize, as a private party in the same circum-
stance is expected to realize, that a foreign law may turn out to be the
proper law of the relationship it is entering into or that a foreign court may
turn out to have jurisdiction over a dispute resulting from such a relation-
ship. Vague and unspecific arguments based on sovereignty or on dignity
are alien to situations of this type. States overly jealous of their "sover-
eignty" or of their "dignity" will be well advised simply to abstain from in-
truding into the juridical sphere of other states by having transnational deal-
ings with nationals of those states.
Id.
181. See supra note 49. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 427 (1963). In Sabbatino, a pre-FSIA case, one of the parties was a foreign sover-
eign. Id. at 398. The Court held that federal common law controlled with respect to
the determination of the choice of law in evaluating the act of state doctrine. Id. at
427. The Court stated that
we are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the Na-
tional Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal
law.... [Professor Philip C. Jessup] recognized the potential dangers were
Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations. He cau-
tioned that rules of international law should not be left to divergent and
perhaps parochial state interpretations.
Id. at 425 (citations omitted).
182. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing reciprocity).
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Congress desired uniformity.' On the other hand, Con-
gress's deafening silence with respect to the question of the
determination of the choice of law, particularly concerning at-
tribution of liability, arguably can lead to the opposite conclu-
sion. Nonetheless, congressional intent is discernable through
both the legislative history and some provisions of the FSIA
that suggest the application of federal common law.' 8 4 For ex-
ample, the FSIA eliminated all traditional restrictions of citi-
zenship and amount in controversy and simplified the process
for removing a case from the state to the federal system.18 5  By
channeling law suits brought against foreign states into the
federal courts, Congress has created the optimum situation for
the application of federal common law to determine attribu-
tion of liability issues.
B. The Argument That the Choice of Law Rules of the FTCA Should
Apply to the FSIA Is Misguided
Some courts have argued, particularly in the context of a
tort action brought under the FSIA, that because the FSIA
contains language similar to that in the FTCA, the choice of
law rules of the FTCA should apply in FSIA actions. 8 6 This
argument is flawed for three reasons. First, this reasoning re-
lies on questionable authorities. Second, the argument misin-
terprets a provision of the FSIA. Finally, the FTCA and FSIA
are not analogous because the FTCA, unlike the FSIA, does
contain a specific choice of law provision.
The first case that discussed the FTCA-FSIA analogy was
183. See, e.g., Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil Aviation of the P.R.C.,
923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991). The court in Barkanic rejected statements in the legisla-
tive history with respect to the goals of "uniformity of decision," stating that the
"Extent of liability" provision expressly embraced "the goal of holding foreign states
liable 'in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.'" Barkanic, 923 F.2d at 960 n.3. "Under these circumstances, we do
not believe that Congress intended to achieve 'uniformity of decision' by applying
different choice of law standards to foreign defendants and private parties." Id.
184. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional de-
sire for uniformity).
185. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (discussing subject matter ju-
risdiction and removal provisions).
186. See supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text (discussing respondeat supe-
rior cases).
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Castro v. Saudi Arabia. 1t 7 Castro, however, relied on a pre-FSIA,
non-foreign sovereign immunities case. 188 Moreover, because
the FSIA preempted the existing body of foreign sovereign im-
munity law at its inception, 89 the validity of this line of cases is
dubious.
The second weakness of this argument is that it miscon-
strues the language of the FSIA.' 90 Although the "Extent of
liability" provision of the FSIA might appear to represent a
choice of law provision, it is not such a provision.'t9 In Bancec,
the Supreme Court held that the "Extent of liability" provision
refers only to rules of financial liability, and not to rules re-
garding the amenability of a foreign sovereign to suit based on
the acts of its agents.'9 2 Thus, reliance on this provision is in-
appropriate as a basis on which to determine the limited ques-
tion of the attribution of liability.
Finally, as a general matter, the analogy between the two
acts is not wholly appropriate. Although the FSIA and FTCA
contain some similar language, the FTCA specifically contains
a choice of law provision whereas the FSIA does not contain
such a provision.' 93 Other courts have rejected the argument
187. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing Castro v. Saudi
Arabia).
188. See Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955); see supra notes 167-75
(discussing authorities cited in Castro v. Saudi Arabia).
189. See supra notes 43-45 (discussing preemptive authority of FSIA).
190. See Skeen v. Federative Republic of Braz., 566 F. Supp. 1414, 1417 n.5
(D.D.C. 1983) (noting that the "extent of liability" sections are nearly identical in
FTCA and FSIA). See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6620. The legislative history states that "the [claims against
which foreign states are immune] provided in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
1605(a)(5) correspond to many of the claims with respect to which the U.S. Govern-
ment retains immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2680 (a) and
(h)." Id.
191. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing "Extent of liabil-
ity" provision).
192. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.ll (1983).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). Section 1346(b) of the FTCA provides, in per-
tinent part, that when the United States government is a defendant
the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States . . . for injury or loss of property, or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
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in favor of such a FTCA-FSIA analogy for this reason in other
contexts. 94
C. Importance of International Law
In order that U.S. foreign sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence reflect the standards of international law, federal com-
mon law should determine the attribution of liability under the
FSIA. Unlike many other nations, governmental power in the
United States is shared among a central, federal authority and
its constituent territorial units. 195 Nonetheless, Congress
stated that by passing the FSIA it sought to conform U.S. prac-
tice with that of other countries. t9 6
In addition to this tension between the federal system in
the United States and the uniform systems of other countries,
the legislative history of the FSIA states that the Act incorpo-
rates standards recognized under international law.' 97 The
Supreme Court has also relied on international law as one of
the sources of its rule with respect to the attribution of liability
in Bancec.'9 8 Thus, U.S. courts have invoked international law
to define commercial activities of a foreign government' 99 and
Id. See Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil Aviation of the P.R.C., 923 F.2d
957, 959 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that "[iut was this general choice of law provision [of
the FTCA], and not the provision on punitive damages, that was the basis for the
Supreme Court's determination that the FTCA requires courts to apply the law of the
place of the act or omission").
194. See, e.g., Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir.
1987). In Harris, the court held that "the FTCA contains an explicit choice of law
provision; there is no such provision in the FSIA .... The upshot is that the FSIA
lacks a section corresponding to FTCA § 1346(b)." Id.
195. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, 1976: Hearings on
H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
Comm. on theJudiciay, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1976) (statement of Bruno Ristau,
Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Department ofJustice). Mr. Ristau
testified that "[t]he system of federalism, as we know it, the closest I can think of, you
would find perhaps in Switzerland. But in all of the other countries in which suits are
brought against the United States, we simply do not encounter these problems of
State-Federal relationships." Id.
196. See supra note 33.
197. See supra note 40 (discussing standards of international law).
198. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983).
199. See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. The Federal Republic of Nig.,
647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d. Cir. 1981) (referring to the legistlative history, pre-FSIA cases
and international law as the "three separate sources of authority to resolve this fun-
damental question"). The court also noted, however, that
[s]ection 1602 of the Act, entitled "Findings and declaration of purpose,"
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to determine whether an entity is an agent or instrumentality
of a foreign state.2 0
Although courts have relied on international law in limited
circumstances, 20 1 U.S. courts should consider further the prac-
tice of other nations. At its core, attribution of liability is the
process whereby foreign states are held liable for the acts of
their agents or servants. The rules of law applied by U.S.
courts to define the relationship between a foreign state and its
agents or servants have transnational ramifications.20 2 As a re-
sult, the choice of law rule employed by U.S. courts to deter-




In 1788, Alexander Hamilton wrote that "[t]he peace of
the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART.
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers
for the conduct of its members. 2 0 4  His admonition remains
valid two centuries later. Through the FSIA, Congress sought
to conform the foreign sovereign immunities practice of the
United States with the practices of other nations. U.S. courts
contains a cryptic reference to international law, but fails wholly to adopt it.
The legislative history states that the Act "incorporates standards recog-
nized under international law," and the drafters seem to have intended
rather generally to bring American sovereign immunity practice into line
with that of other nations.
Id. at 310 (citations omitted). The court implied that the omission of the phrase "and
other principles of international law" from the end of § 1602 in the original version
of the bill meant that the FSIA did not intend to embrace these international law
principles. Id. at 310. The court did not discuss the testimony of witnesses who
stated that the 1973 and 1976 versions were virtually identical with the exception of
technical corrections. See supra note 18 (discussing original FSIA legislation).
200. See, e.g., Bancec, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
201. See supra notes 199-200.
202. See GORDON A. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 321, 322 (Richard B. Lillich ed. 1983). Mr. Christenson ar-
gues that "[ilt is essential [ ] if states are to be held accountable for wrongful conduct,
that the international community define what action properly is attributable to
them." Id. Indeed, Mr. Christenson decries the use of private law terms such as
respondeat superior and agency arguing that use of these terms avoids "key ques-
tions about the conduct of States in a larger world context." Id.
203. Id. at 346. Mr. Christenson states that "[a]ll nations use the [doctrine of
attribution] to clarify their own conduct in relation to the international community
and international law." Id.
204. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, 406 (A. Hamilton) (B. Blackwell 2d ed. 1987).
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should apply federal common law to determine whether a for-
eign sovereign is amenable to suit in U.S. courts for the acts of
its agents or servants. Invoking state law to determine attribu-
tion of liability may be an expedient approach to resolving
cases, but in the long run it both undermines the purposes of
the FSIA and unnecessarily impairs the good will of foreign
states toward the United States.
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